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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The purpose of the present study was to assess the effects of accountability on 
leniency reduction in self-ratings. It was hypothesized that participants in both the 
upward and illegitimate accountability condition would have lower levels of leniency in 
their self-ratings than participants in the no accountability condition.  Accountability was 
operationalized as participants being told that they would have to justify their self-ratings 
of driving performance to either a professor who specializes in driving research (upward 
accountability) or to an education graduate student who maintains the driving simulator 
(illegitimate accountability) via an audiotape. The results showed that accountability had 
a significant effect on leniency reduction in self-ratings of driving performance. The 
implications of these results, limitations, and ideas for future research are discussed.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Much appraisal research has cited the incorporation of self-appraisals (i.e., self-
evaluations or self-ratings) as a mechanism for increasing perceptions of fairness in the 
appraisal system. Although performance appraisal systems add value to many companies 
and organizations, political factors that supervisors, subordinates, and other workers 
employ to achieve their personal motives and objectives take away from the value of 
these systems as tools to achieve organizational goals (Longenecker, Sims, and Gioia, 
1987). According to organizational researchers, many employees attempt to control their 
own outcomes and they attempt to either maintain or gain power through the appraisal 
system.  Additionally, the way in which many supervisors appraise subordinates is not 
based on accuracy indexes more so than these political considerations; some of the 
reasons why politics supersede accuracy in performance appraisals are because of the 
desire for employees, to maintain good interpersonal relationships with  each other—
especially supervisors’ desire to maintain good interpersonal relationships with their 
subordinates—and their acknowledgement of the importance of the appraisal as 
documentation that could either help advance or hinder an employee’s growth within an 
organization (Longenecker et al., 1987).  
As a result of political considerations that are employed in performance 
appraisals, many employees perceive these appraisal systems as being unfair and not 
based on their actual performance. In order to overcome these perceptions of unfairness, 
 2
self-appraisals have been employed as a participatory mechanism for all employees 
within the performance appraisal system. Employees like self-appraisals because they 
perceive them as being fair and being an accurate assessment of their job performance. 
The use of self-appraisals is one way that each employee has a voice (input) in the system 
and self-appraisals can be used to increase perceptions of fairness. According to Roberts 
(2002), performance appraisals that are perceived as unfair by employees have negative 
outcomes for the organization as a whole, including a lack of motivation to change 
performance behavior after their appraisals have been given, a rejection of the 
performance appraisal system as a whole, and a rejection to abide by human resources 
decisions that are influenced by performance appraisal information. As a result of these 
perceptions of unfairness, many industrial and organizational psychologists believe that 
employees’ performance will decrease as a result of their viewing the appraisal system as 
an inaccurate measure of their job performance (Roberts, 1994). 
Self-appraisals serve as a source of employee input into the appraisal system 
because employees assess their own level of performance on various dimensions of their 
jobs. These self-appraisals serve as physical documentation that can potentially be used 
as a basis of a supervisor’s evaluation of that employee’s job performance. As a result of 
employees being able to evaluate their own performance, self-appraisals increase 
perceptions of fairness with the performance appraisal system because supervisors can 
take these self-appraisals into consideration when they evaluate employees’ job 
performance. Research has shown that the employment of self-evaluations in the 
performance appraisal system increases levels of satisfaction with the performance 
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appraisal system and with the overall organization; self-evaluations reduce interpersonal 
conflict between supervisors and subordinates when the latter party receives negative 
feedback; and the use of self-appraisals reduces the general anxiety and tension that 
employees have about the performance appraisal process (Roberts, 2002). Therefore, 
when self-ratings are employed within the performance appraisal system, it fosters an 
employee’s maturation and progression throughout an organization (Roberts, 2002). 
When workers participate in the appraisal process via the use of self-ratings, they are able 
to have a voice as to the ratings that they receive from their supervisor because they are 
able to dispute these ratings that they received via physical or verbal feedback based on 
their own evaluations of their performance (Roberts, 2002). When workers have a voice 
in the appraisal process, they take more responsibility for their appraisal ratings that they 
receive by their supervisors (regardless of whether they are positive or negative 
performance appraisals), and they are more likely to think that the procedural and 
distributive processes of the appraisal system are just. Positive interpersonal relationships 
between supervisors and subordinates are fostered through this form of employee 
participation, which in turn lead to better supervisory strategies that aid in the 
development of their subordinates; this subordinate development then eliminates 
interpersonal disputes and discrepancies that may arise from supervisors’ negative 
feedback or performance ratings of their subordinates (Roberts, 2002).  
Although there are many positive benefits to the use of self-ratings, many 
organizations often avoid self-ratings because they are highly susceptible to leniency 
bias. Many organizations are wary of using self-ratings because they believe that 
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employees will not give an accurate assessment of their own job performance. Instead, 
and as research has shown, employees will be lenient in their self-appraisals of their job 
performance and they will also lack congruency with other sources of performance 
appraisal. As will be discussed later in more detail, researchers such as Thornton (1980) 
have found that employees tended to be more lenient in their self-appraisals of job 
performance and that these self-appraisals were incongruent with supervisor and peer 
ratings. Harris and Schaubroeck (1988) also reached this conclusion in their meta-
analysis of self-supervisor, self-peer, and peer-supervisor ratings, which is still referenced 
today by researchers examining the congruence between each source of performance 
appraisal ratings.  
As mentioned  earlier, within the performance appraisal system, many appraisal 
ratings are not based on completely accurate performance measures. Additionally, 
employees who use self-ratings tend to overrate their performance behavior. Recent 
research on accountability has shown it to be an effective mechanism in curbing leniency 
on performance appraisals. Accountability is a current buzzword in the popular press and 
media, and research on accountability has emerged in various fields from educational 
psychology to industrial and organizational psychology. In a psychological context, 
accountability is defined as the internal or external belief that people may be required to 
justify their behavior (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). 
As a result of the positive implications that self-appraisals and accountability have 
for the entire appraisal process along with the organization as a whole, it is important to 
examine research that has been done on self-appraisals, and it is important to examine 
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research that has assessed the accuracy and problems associated with the usage of this 
form of evaluation. Also, it is important to examine accountability, specifically to 
determine if it can be applied to lessen leniency in self-appraisals.  
Literature Review of Self-Appraisals 
Muchinsky (2003) defines self-assessments as employees evaluating their own 
performance. Usually these self-assessments are used for the improvement of employees 
within organizations, but 5% of U.S. companies use these self-appraisals for job 
performance evaluations (Atwater, 1998). For instance, in the city of Bismarck, North 
Dakota, self-assessments are 25% of city employees’ performance evaluations.  
The usefulness of self-appraisals is reduced by various factors, such as rating 
purpose. Bretz, Milkovich, and Read (1992) conducted a literature review on the past 
appraisal literature and they found—from both laboratory and field studies—that when 
self-appraisals were used for evaluative purposes, they were prone to highly susceptible 
to leniency bias. Campbell and Lee (1988) believed that rather than using self-ratings for 
evaluative purposes, they should be used strictly for developmental purposes, and these 
authors believed that subsequent employee performance could be improved with the use 
of self-appraisals because they would form a self-fulfilling prophecy for the employees; 
in other words, the employees would feel as if their self-appraisals would be reflective of 
their future performance evaluations from their supervisors. 
Early organizational researchers believed that self-assessments could be explained 
by cognitive mechanisms, particularly self-schemata (Markus, 1977). Markus (1977) 
found support for the concept of self-schemata, that when employees gathered, stored, 
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and retrieved information in a certain context, they created self-schemata; in other words, 
they created systems of cognition about themselves. This author defines self-schemata as 
a cognitive mechanism that aids one’s gathering and synthesizing of behavioral 
information that is present in one’s social environment, and this mechanism comes from 
generalizations that one makes about himself or herself based on previous behaviors (e.g., 
past performance; Markus, 1977). The author found that self-schemata help ease the 
complexity of synthesizing self-related information and they help people predict their 
own future behavior in an easier manner (Markus, 1977). Along with these findings, 
Markus (1977) found that self-schemata also made individuals more prone to resist 
information that did not align with information that was contained in their schemata. This 
finding was pivotal to self-appraisal research as it would pave the way for future research 
regarding the impact of self-esteem on leniency in self-appraisal ratings.  
Although the previous authors felt that self-rating scales should be used only for 
developmental purposes rather than for evaluative purposes, these scales can yield 
accurate information about employees’ performance within organizations. But more often 
than not, research has shown that many inadequacies exist with the usage of these types 
of performance appraisals. 
Thornton (1980) conducted a literature review on the psychometric properties of 
self-appraisals of job performance by examining factors such as construct validity, 
variability, halo, and leniency that affect the accuracy of self-appraisals. The author 
found that self-appraisals often lack congruency with other sources of performance 
appraisal, such as supervisors and peers, and the author found that self-appraisals were 
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affected by leniency bias and a lack of variability and a lack of divergent validity 
(Thornton, 1980). Thornton’s (1980) literature review also yielded inconclusive findings 
regarding whether self-appraisals could be improved via a psychometric property such as 
its scale format, or via rater training to eliminate potential leniency biases.  
Mabe and West (1982) extended the previous literature review by examining the 
validity of self-evaluations in terms of employees’ ability to rate themselves on the 
dimensions of their job performance. The authors conducted a meta-analytic review of 55 
studies that examined self-evaluations of performance when compared with other more 
objective measures of performance. Mabe and West (1982) found that self-evaluations 
were correlated with ability and measures of performance when individuals possessed a 
high level of intelligence, a high need for achievement, and when individuals possessed a 
high level of internal locus of control. Potential reasons for the lack of alignment between 
self-ratings and other measures of performance revolved around a rater’s past exposure to 
self-appraisals, and whether workers had to identify themselves when they submitted 
their self-evaluations (Mabe & West, 1982).  
Although the aforementioned reasons were cited as primary reasons for the lack 
of validity for self-evaluations, other studies showed that the reasons for the inaccuracies 
for these self-assessments are because they are highly subject to self-esteem, leniency and 
self-enhancement biases. 
Regan, Gosselink, Hubsch, and Ulsh (1975) conducted one of the earliest 
experiments on the impact of self-esteem on leniency in self-appraisals. The authors 
examined a need-for-self-esteem and they posited that participants would overrate their 
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abilities, reject counterfactual information to their self-schemata, and overreact to 
reverence from fellow participants (Regan et al., 1975). Participants were assigned as 
either actors or bystanders and the actors rated their own behavior along with bystanders 
on a task after they were complimented or scorned for their performance. The authors did 
not find evidence for a need-for-self-esteem notion; in fact, the authors found the 
contrary, a self-deflation bias in which they rated themselves lower after being criticized 
and they did not overrespond to praise (Regan et al., 1975). It is important to note that the 
authors failed to assess the participants’ level of self-esteem prior to assigning the 
participants to the treatment condition and this threatens the internal validity of their 
study because there was no way to examine whether they obtained their results as a result 
of participants lacking self-esteem. Also, history effects may have interfered with the 
study.  Subsequent studies did not replicate these authors’ findings; indeed, future 
research they found quite contrary results. 
Meyer (1980) tested engineers at General Electric Company for positive leniency 
bias and he found that they exhibited this characteristic; the majority of the engineers 
thought that their performance was at the top 25th percentile of the company. Although 
they may have believed this, this is not possible because it is highly unlikely that 90 
percent of one’s workforce is at top 25th percentile for job performance. Anderson, 
Warner, and Spencer (1984) conducted a study which showed that leniency and self-
enhancement are prevalent in self-rating scales. These researchers made up a self-
evaluation form for clerical tasks as well as tasks that sounded true but were really false, 
such as “operating a matriculation machine” and “circumscribing general meeting 
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registers” (Anderson et al., 1984). The authors of this study found that the applicants 
inflated their abilities for both the real and bogus tasks (Anderson et al., 1984).  
Holzbach (1978) examined leniency bias in self-ratings by looking at performance 
appraisals of 107 managerial and 76 professional employees in a medium-sized 
manufacturing location. The author found that self-appraisals had greater levels of 
leniency than superior or peer assessments, and the authors found a lack of congruency 
between self-supervisor and self-peer assessments as compared to other forms of 
appraisals (e.g., supervisor and peer appraisals; Holzbach 1978).  Felson (1981) took a 
different approach to the examination of self-ratings by examining bias in self-ratings 
among football players via looking at ambiguity and bias in the self-concept. College 
football players assessed their own performance on seven different dimensions of athletic 
skill. The coaches served the supervisory role in which they assessed the football players’ 
levels of performance along with their perceptions of how much confidence the football 
players possessed; football players rated their own levels of self-confidence by 
responding to one item that asked them to rate their self-confidence (Felson, 1981). 
Felson (1981) believed that ambiguity would influence the relationship of leniency levels 
in the football players’ self-ratings. The author found that ambiguity did influence levels 
of leniency in self-ratings because when football players were required to rate their own 
abilities on ambiguous athletic dimensions of skill, they were more prone to inflate their 
ratings of ability compared to less ambiguous ratings of ability (Felson, 1981). The 
author believed that the results indicated that ambiguous abilities contained on self-
assessments yield responses from self-raters that are indicative of their levels of self-
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esteem rather than their true level of ability on those particular ambiguous dimensions 
(Felson, 1981).  
Podsakoff and Organ (1986) identified problems that arise with the use of self-
reports in organizational research. The authors identified six uses for self-rating scales: 
1. Obtaining demographic or otherwise factual data (such as age or sex of the 
 respondent, years of tenure, etc.) that are, in principle, verifiable from other 
 sources.  
2. Assessing the effectiveness of experimental manipulations.  
3. Gathering personality data (trait anxiety, need for achievement, locus of 
 control, and so forth). 
4. Obtaining descriptions of respondents’ past or characteristic behavior (e.g., 
 asking supervisors about their “structuring” behaviors), and/or seeking 
 respondents’ intentions of future behavior (e.g., to quit), or how they would 
 behave under certain hypothetical conditions (i.e., various role-playing exercises).  
5. Scaling the psychological states of respondents, such as job attitudes, tension, 
 or motivation.  
6. Soliciting respondents’ perceptions of an external environmental variable (the 
 supervisor’s behavior, formalization of organization processes, climate).  
Along with these uses of self-report data, other uses of self report data could 
include: 
7. Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (OCBs) 
8. Counterproductive work behaviors 
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The authors indicated that a major problem with these purposes is that they are 
not distinct from each other when the self-assessments are designed; so, these self-
assessments place conflicting demands upon the rater because they ask participants about 
demographic information, past behavior, predicted future behavior, and external 
environmental variables, rather than the self-appraisal focusing on a clear and distinct 
purpose (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). This, in turn, creates ambiguity (as shown in the 
previous study) and creates leniency in the self-ratings. Yet, the authors believed that 
rather than focusing on methods of reducing leniency as a solution to improve the 
accuracy of self-ratings, the focus should be on examining the way in which the self-
assessment scales are created (Podsakoff  & Organ, 1986) and they believed that these 
problems could be alleviated via statistical procedures and scale reordering. Yet, as will 
be seen later in this literature review, these problems were not and could not be 
eliminated by enhancing the psychometric properties of the self-appraisals. 
Farh and Werbel (1986) conducted experimental research in which they tested for 
leniency by varying the purpose of the performance appraisals, such as using self-
appraisals for administrative purposes (e.g., pay raises, promotions, etc.) or for non-
administrative purposes (e.g., fostering employee growth and development). They found 
that when self-appraisals were used for administrative purposes, they were more lenient 
than when these appraisals were used for non-administrative purposes (Farh & Werbel, 
1986). Yet, when self-appraisals are used for high-expectation validation—the belief that 
self-reported information will be verified against some other performance measures—and 
for administrative purposes, the authors of the study found that the appraisals were more 
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accurate and that they contained less leniency (Farh & Werbel, 1986). This study 
foreshadows the purpose of the current study because validation is very similar to 
accountability which was examined in the present study.  
Harris and Schaubroeck (1988) conducted an important meta-analysis of self-
supervisor, self-peer, and peer-supervisor ratings, which is still referenced by researchers 
examining the congruence between different sources of performance appraisal ratings. 
The authors conducted a meta-analysis to determine whether self-ratings lacked 
congruency with other sources of appraisal ratings because they believed that previous 
studies yielded inconsistent findings (Harris and Schaubroeck, 1988). Harris and 
Schaubroeck (1988) found results that aligned with previous studies on the relationship 
between self- and other sources of performance ratings. They found that a low to 
moderate correlation existed between self-ratings and supervisor ratings (ρ = .35) and 
between self- and peer ratings (ρ = .36). It is important to note that the authors findings 
put to rest claims by Podsakoff and Organ (1986), along with other researchers who 
believed that the quality of self-assessments could be improved via improving their 
psychometric properties because the authors of this study found that rating format and 
rating scale had no impact on the lack of congruency between self and other sources of 
appraisals (Harris & Schaubroek, 1988). The authors believed that potential causes for 
the lack of congruency were a result of leniency within the self-ratings (which comes 
from the egocentric bias), levels of self-esteem among self-raters, and different 
conceptions of the job as a result of the source of the performance evaluation (Harris & 
Schaubroek, 1988).  
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Farh and Dobbins (1989) examined the effects of self-esteem on leniency bias in 
self-reports of performance using structural equation modeling by examining 
undergraduate students’ self-appraisals of their grades in an organizational behavior 
course. The authors found that participants’ self-assessments of their job performance 
exhibited leniency bias and the authors attributed these leniency effects to the 
participants’ levels of self-esteem, and the authors found that higher levels of leniency 
existed in self-reports when these ratings were made on ambiguous job dimensions (Farh 
& Dobbins, 1989). The authors suggested that individuals who possessed a high level of 
self-esteem were more likely to reject negative feedback regarding their performance 
(Farh & Dobbins, 1989). This study aligns itself with previous research that showed that 
self-esteem and ambiguity affected self-ratings in the sense that they made them more 
prone to leniency bias.  
Shore, Shore, and Thornton (1992) examined the construct validity of self-
evaluations of performance dimensions in assessment centers by testing 394 employees 
from a large petroleum company on their future managerial abilities and these employees 
rated themselves on how well they did on all of the dimensions covered in exercises that 
they had to perform at the assessment center. Shore et al. (1992) found that self-
evaluations were correlated with assessor ratings of potential managerial abilities; yet, the 
authors also found there was very low construct validity for the self-evaluations of 
performance dimensions in assessment centers. As previous research has indicated, the 
authors found that the reason for low construct validity was that amount of leniency 
found in self-assessments. Specifically, the authors found that only 6% of the participants 
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placed themselves in the bottom third of the assessment group, whereas roughly 57% of 
the participants indicated that they performed at the upper tier of performers within their 
assessment group (Shore et al., 1992). The authors indicated that the leniency and rating 
inflation that they found in self-appraisals aligned with previous research on the existence 
of leniency bias in self-rating scales (Shore et al., 1992). 
John and Robins (1994) took a different approach to the leniency bias in self-
ratings by examining individual differences in self-enhancement and the role of 
narcissism among self-ratings. The authors studied self-assessments of performance to 
determine their levels of accuracy and leniency bias. 102 MBA students participated in a 
group discussion that revolved around managerial duties and they assessed their own 
performance via their involvement in the discussion (John & Robins, 1994). Although 
individual differences did weaken the level of self-enhancement bias in the self ratings, 
participants inflated their ratings of their performance in the managerial discussion when 
compared to their peers and the staff (that oversaw the management discussion group). 
The authors found that self-enhancement bias had a moderate correlation with narcissism 
(r = .46), a relatively general and constant individual difference variable. This finding 
suggested that the self-enhancement bias found in the self-ratings reflects an 
individualistic tendency for people to see themselves in an overly positive light (John & 
Robbins, 1994). 
Similar to the previous study that dealt with a management group discussion, 
Furnham and Stringfield (1998) assessed the level of congruency between self, peer, and 
superior assessment assessments by assigning managers to seven teams that were task 
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oriented. Managers on these teams worked with each other between 4 and 6 months on an 
organizational project. Upon the completion of the organizational project, each team 
received ratings from three other sources including themselves (i.e., peers, superior, and a 
consultant). The authors' findings did not differ from previous literature on self-ratings 
because they found that self-ratings did not correlate with the other three measures of 
performance. The authors also found that self-ratings were more lenient than the other 
measures of performance (Furnham & Stringfield, 1998) which is consistent with 
previous research as well. Sala and Dwight (2002) conducted an assessment of executive 
performance among 276 senior executives for a global technological company by 
distributing self-assessments along with peer assessments to these executives to 
complete. Although the results showed a strong correlation between direct reports and 
self-reports, the overall findings of the study indicated that self-reports did not relate to 
the executives’ actual measures of job performance (Sala & Dwight, 2002). 
However, it is important to note that leniency is not a universal phenomenon. 
Farh, Dobbins, and Cheng (1991) who showed that Taiwanese employees tended to rate 
themselves modestly and hence are not lenient with their self-assessments. Yet, according 
to studies conducted by Arvey and Murphy (1998) and Yu and Murphy (1993), Chinese 
employees tended to exhibit leniency bias in their self-ratings of job performance. 
Xie, Roy and Chen (2006) examined cultural and individual level differences in 
self-rating behavior in order to build upon research regarding the cultural relativity 
hypothesis—which posits that people’s social preferences and interpersonal interactions 
can be explained in part by the individualism-collectivism dichotomy. The authors stated 
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that previous research has made a faulty assumption that individualism-collectivism lies 
on a continuum, and the authors believed that these two variables may be orthogonal (Xie 
et al, 2006). The study examined self-enhancement and general self-efficacy as potential 
mediators between self-assessments and individualism, and they sought to see whether 
individualism, specifically the individual assessment of individualism, is the major 
contributor to the leniency bias in self-ratings as compared to differences on a cultural 
level (i.e., individualism v. culturalism). The authors found that the individual assessment 
of individualism was the best predictor of self-rating leniency, and this study questioned 
the notion of examining leniency effects on a cultural level. Instead, and based on their 
findings, the authors believe that individual differences would predict one’s tendency to 
overrate themselves on self-appraisals of job performance. 
Atwater (1998) notes that research shows that self-assessments are the most 
accurate for job performance when these assessments are not used for salary increases or 
advances in job placements (i.e., when they are used for administrative purposes). 
According to Williams and Levy (1992), when employees are knowledgeable about the 
mechanisms involved in the job performance appraisal process and there is less 
ambiguity about the appraisal system, their self-appraisals are more likely to be accurate. 
Also, Farh and Werbel (1986) found that when employees are certain that their job 
performance will be based on an objective standard, then their self-appraisals will yield 
the most accurate results about their job performance. 
These reasons for the inaccuracies of self-rating scales are not a surprise to many 
researchers and psychologists. Gosling, John, Craik, and Robins (1998) found that many 
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self-concept theorists believe that people strive to keep and heighten their self-worth to 
various phenomena. Taylor and Brown (1994) found that many people contain personal 
positive illusions about their job-related abilities and job performance. In fact, the self-
enhancement theory is described by many people as if it were an inherent trait in all of us 
(Gosling et al., 1998). Although many people believe that self-enhancement is a natural 
human phenomenon, this belief has not been supported through a significant amount of 
studies (Gosling et al., 1998).  
Along with these studies, Gosling et al. (1998) conducted a study in which they 
assessed the accuracy of self-rating scales by comparing these scales with online codings 
by observers. Participants had to complete a task and fill out a self-rating scale on how 
well they completed this task. Initially, the authors of this study found a correlation 
between the self-reports and the observer codings, and they found that the average 
relationship between the self-reports and the observer codings was low. But, the authors 
viewed this correlation as a false representation of the accuracy of the students’ self-
reports and they decided to only use 12 acts that were deemed as highly reliable by the 
observers. From this decision, the self reports were more accurate because the average 
correlation was moderately high (r = .40; Gosling et al., 1998).    
Although they are subject to leniency effects, it seems as if self-appraisals are 
viable future mechanisms for organizational assessment because these reports can be 
used to assess the job performance of workers within an organization (Gosling et al., 
1998). Additionally, if they were used, organizations would have more buy-in from 
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employees about the appraisal system which could lead to increased employee 
satisfaction and increased employee job performance. 
Thus, although self-assessments have been used in many organizations, the 
reliability and validity of self-assessments are weakened by leniency bias that may result 
from various factors such as ambiguity among the employees regarding the purpose of 
the appraisal or as a result of high levels of self-esteem. In order to effectively 
incorporate self-appraisals into the general appraisal system, these threats to the 
usefulness of self-appraisals must be eliminated. 
Model and Solutions for Self-Assessments 
As a result of the inadequacies that lie within self-assessments, researchers have 
attempted to develop a general model for self-assessments. Levy (1993) proposed a path-
analytic model to predict the relationships among self-esteem, locus of control, self-
appraisal, and attributions. 270 participants completed two individual difference 
measures (self-esteem and locus of control) and then worked on a test that the believed 
was a managerial selection instrument and made attributions for their performance. After 
they completed these measures, they then completed self-assessments of their 
performance. These measures pertained to the various factors that were hypothesized to 
affect self-assessments. The authors proposed a model that was shown to be significant as 
a result of their findings. The following are the components of the model: 
1. a positive relationship between self-esteem and self-appraisal such that those 
 higher in esteem reported higher self-appraisals than their low esteem 
 counterparts. 
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2. a negative relationship between locus of control and self-appraisals such that 
 those believing they had more control over their environment reported higher self-
 appraisal ratings than do who felt that they had less control over their 
 environment. 
3. a positive relationship between locus of control and attributional tendency such 
 that those believing that they had more control over their environment made more 
 internal attributions about their performance than those who believed that they 
 had less control over their environment. 
4. A negative relationship between self-appraisals and attributional tendency such 
 that those reporting higher self-appraisals made more internal attributions for their 
 performance than those who reported lower self-appraisals. 
In the context of Levy’s (1993) model of self-appraisals, self-appraisal research 
has focused on ways to reduce leniency bias as a result of self-esteem and locus of 
control. Locus of control can be tied to raters’ ambiguity regarding the purpose of the 
appraisal system because if they are unclear about the purpose of the self-ratings, they 
may feel that they have less control over their environment and as a result be more lenient 
on these appraisals. Farh, Werbel, and Bedeian (1988) attempted to implement a self-
appraisal based performance evaluation system (SABPE) among 88 faculty members at a 
large land grant university. The SABPE incorporated self-appraisals into traditional 
supervisory evaluation procedures and faculty members knew the dimensions of 
performance evaluation that supervisors used when evaluating their performance, such as 
instructional method (teaching methods/technique, teaching innovation, and curricula 
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development) and instructional support. The authors found that the SABPE significantly 
reduced leniency, increased the correlation between self and supervisory rating, and 
moderated the correlation between self and objective criterion measurements (Farh et al., 
1988). Although this was a significant study as it showed a way to improve self-
appraisals, it did not have significant generalizability because the SABPE was only 
focused within the teaching context. 
Along with creating a self-appraisal evaluative system for faculty members, 
Williams and Levy (1992) assessed the effects of perceived system knowledge (PSK) on 
the agreement between self-ratings and supervisory ratings; PSK was defined as how 
much knowledge employees thought they had on dimensions of job performance. The 
study was conducted on 73 employees from two Midwestern financial institutions who 
completed a PSK questionnaire. The results indicated that self-ratings were correlated 
more with supervisors’ ratings when the subordinates indicated that they had high levels 
of perceived system knowledge. Yet, it should be noted that in a dissertation, Groehler 
(1997) assessed whether PSK contributed to the level of agreement between self- and 
supervisor ratings sources and she found that it did not. Instead, Groehler (1997) stated 
that actual level of knowledge of performance appraisal system was a more important 
variable than PSK which would align with Farh and colleagues’ (1989) study because 
faculty members received the information that supervisors used for performance 
appraisals therefore increasing their actual knowledge of the performance appraisal 
system. 
 21
Along with research on employee’s level of knowledge of the performance 
appraisal system, other researchers assessed the effects of comparative performance 
information on the accuracy of self-ratings and the agreement between self- and 
supervisor ratings. Farh and Dobbins (1989) hypothesized that leniency effects would be 
reduced by increasing the correlation between self-ratings and objective measures of 
performance and between self-ratings and supervisory ratings when comparative 
information was used. 163 undergraduate students were either assigned to a control 
condition or the social comparison condition; regarding the latter condition, participants 
were provided with information about their hypothetical coworkers who performed the 
same editing task as they did. The authors found that correlations between self- and 
supervisor evaluations and between self-evaluations and objective performance indicators 
were significantly greater when self-raters were given the same comparative information 
that was available to supervisors. The results obtained in this study can be seen as an 
addition to the findings of the previous study because they highlight how self-appraisals 
can be used when employees are aware of the dimensions that supervisors use to evaluate 
their job performance (Farh & Dobbins, 1989). 
Schrader and Steiner (1996) expanded research on comparison standards by 
assessing which comparison standards would be the most effective at improving the 
correlation between self and supervisory performance ratings. The authors examined five 
different types of comparison standards (ambiguous, internal, absolute, relative, and 
multiple) among 202 supervisors and subordinates from nine different organizations in a 
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large Southern city. The authors found that more explicit and objective comparative 
standards produced higher levels of interrater agreement (Schrader & Steiner, 1996).  
Although the aforementioned studies on employees’ level of knowledge and 
comparative information have shed light on ways to reduce leniency bias, it is important 
to revisit the Farh and Werbel (1986) study of the influence of purpose of the 
performance appraisal and the expectation of validation on self-appraisal leniency. The 
authors posited that self-appraisals would be less lenient when they were used for a 
research purpose as compared to a grading purpose, and the authors hypothesized that 
leniency would be drastically reduced when the 62 participants were told that their self-
ratings, regarding their classroom participation, would be validated against some 
evaluative standard compared to when there was no validation. This study had major 
implications for the future of research regarding leniency in performance appraisals 
because researchers have begun to examine a variant of validation, accountability, in the 
context of how it could reduce leniency and increase accuracy in job performance. 
Self-Appraisals and Accountability 
Tetlock (1983) was one of the first researchers to examine the effects of 
accountability in social psychology. In this initial study, accountability was defined as the 
expectation of people to provide justification to someone else about their views, and the 
current definition of accountability is based off of this study (Tetlock, 1983). In their 
literature review of research on the effects of accountability, Lerner and Tetlock (1999) 
asserted that there are four specific dimensions of accountability: mere presence, 
identifiability, evaluation, and reason giving. Mere presence refers to the expectation that 
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a person will observe one’s behavior regarding their performance; identifiability refers to 
participants belief that they will have to provide proof that they conducted ratings; 
evaluation refers to participants’ belief that their behavior will be assessed by somebody 
else; and reason giving refers to the participants expectation that they will have to provide 
an explanation for their actions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  
According to Lerner and Tetlock (1999), eight different types of accountability 
exist: accountability to an audience with known views, accountability to an audience with 
unknown views, predecisional accountability, postdecisional accountability, outcome 
accountability, process accountability, legitimate accountability, and illegitimate 
accountability. Accountability to an audience with unknown views refers to the fact that 
participants will be expected to provide justification for their performance behavior to an 
audience whose views are unknown as compared to the contrary with accountability to an 
audience with known views. Predecisional accountability refers to  participants being told 
that they will have to provide justification for their decisions prior to making them 
whereas postdecisional accountability refers to participants being told after they have 
made a decision that they have to justify their rationale for their decisions (Lerner & 
Tetlock, 1999). Outcome accountability refers to the effectiveness of participants’ 
decisions being the primary criterion for their performance evaluation whereas process 
accountability refers to participants’ decision processes being the criteria for their 
performance evaluation (Simonson & Staw, 1992). Legitimate accountability refers to 
participants’ belief that they feel obliged to provide justification to a source because they 
feel that that source should be obeyed whereas illegitimate accountability entails 
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participants holding a view contrary to legitimate accountability (Tyler, 1997). It is also 
important to note that Tetlock and Kim (1987) manipulated accountability in terms of 
preexposure-accountability and post-exposure accountability; preexposure-accountability 
refers to participants justifying their initial impressions of a test-takers prior to receiving 
the test-takers’ responses versus postexposure-accountability referring to participants 
justifying their impressions of the test-takers after they received the test-takers’ responses 
(Tetlock & Kim, 1987). Also, Harris (1994) conceptualized accountability in terms of 
upward versus downward accountability. Upward accountability refers to employees 
providing justification of their ratings of a subordinate to their supervisor whereas 
downward accountability refers to employees providing the actual subordinates with 
justification for their ratings of those subordinates (Harris, 1994). Therefore, because of 
these many different operationalizations of accountability, it is important to examine 
research on the effectiveness of accountability on reducing biases.  
As mentioned earlier, Tetlock was one of the first social psychologist to study 
accountability and in one particular study (1983), he examined the effects of 
accountability on people’s stances regarding social issues. It was hypothesized that 
participants in the accountability conditions would engage in more cognitive thought 
processing; it was also hypothesized that participants in the accountability condition who 
had to report to an individual’s with known social views would more likely to shift their 
own views in line with those individuals and engage in less thought processing; 
participants who had to justify their views to individuals whose views were unknown 
were more likely to engage in more cognitive thought processing so that they would be 
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able to justify their decisions to individuals regardless of the stance that those individuals 
took.  Forty-eight participants had to describe their opinions on three social issues—
affirmative action, capital punishment, and temporary issues—and the participants were 
assigned to one of four conditions: accountability to an individual with liberal views, 
accountability to an individual with conservative views, accountability to an individual 
with unknown views, and anonymity of their thought processes.  The results indicated 
that participants who reported to individuals with known views were more likely to shift 
their stances on the social issues to the views of that individual; but when participants 
were accountable to individuals with unknown views, participants were more likely to 
engage in more cognitive thought processing (Tetlock, 1983). From Tetlock’s (1983) 
initial study, it seemed as if accountability was most effective when people had to justify 
their views to people with unknown views.  
Tetlock and Kim (1987) extended the previous line of research by examining the 
effects of accountability on participants’ cognitive processing on a personality task. The 
researchers hypothesized that participants’ levels of confidence would decrease on items 
on a personality measure that could be argued as either having true or false predictions. 
Sixty undergraduate students were told that they would participate in a person-perception 
process—how people created opinions of others based off of certain types of information. 
They were given Personality Research Form (PRF) responses from three persons and 
they had to write a biographical description of each person based off of their PRF 
responses. After they completed this task, participants had to predict the three test-takers’ 
likely responses to additional sets of PRF questions and rate their level of confidence of 
 26
whether their predictions would be true (likely to occur) or false (unlikely to occur). 
Participants were assigned to one of three accountability conditions: preexposure-
accountability (participants had to describe how they formed impressions of the test-
takers’ prior to receiving their PRF scores), postexposure accountability (participants had 
to explain how they formed impressions of the test-takers and how they  wrote their test-
takers’ biographies after receiving the test-takers’ PRF scores), and no accountability 
condition; participants in the accountability condition were told that their interviews 
would be audiotaped for data-analysis purposes. The results supported the original 
hypothesis, that participants’ levels of confidence would decrease for PRF items that 
could either have true or false predictions and participants engaged in more cognitive 
thought processing. Thus, this research supported existing literature that suggested that 
accountability may be the most effective when participants have to justify their behaviors 
to an individual with unknown views but this occurred more in the preexposure 
accountability condition than in either the postexposure- or no-accountability conditions.  
Antonioni (1994) took a different approach to the study of accountability from the 
previous social psychological background by applying the previous research to the 
workforce. Antonioni (1994) studied the effects of feedback accountability on upward 
appraisal ratings because the author was interested in whether employees assigned 
different ratings to their managers based on whether they were held accountable. The 
author of this study focused on one particular dimension when defining accountability, 
identifiability, by making the subordinates identify themselves on the upward appraisals. 
It was hypothesized that managers who knew the names of subordinates rating them 
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would view the appraisal process more positively than managers who received appraisals 
from anonymous subordinates; it was hypothesized that subordinates who have to 
identify themselves on their appraisals of their managers will have a less positive view 
about the upward appraisal system that subordinates who anonymously appraised their 
managers; and it was hypothesized that subordinates who were accountable for their 
upward appraisals of their managers would make more positive ratings than subordinates 
who provided upward appraisals of their managers anonymously. Thirty-eight managers 
and 183 subordinates participated in the study, and these participants were either assigned 
to the accountability condition or the anonymity condition. Subordinates completed the 
Upward Leadership Behavior Assessment (ULBA) of their managers in either condition, 
and managers received either a summary of the ULBA report from the anonymous 
subordinates or complete ULBA reports from accountable subordinates. The results 
supported the original hypotheses, that managers would support the upward appraisal 
system more when subordinates were accountable for their ratings, that subordinates in 
the anonymity condition would feel more positive about the upward appraisal process 
when they were anonymous (than accountable), and that accountable subordinates were 
more likely to significantly inflate their ratings of their managers compared to 
anonymous subordinates. Although this study would seem to imply that accountability 
would cause more leniency amongst subordinates in the appraisal systems within 
organizations, caution should be warranted for the author’s limited operationalizations of 
accountability as it only entails one of the four dimensions of accountability, 
identifiability (Antonioni, 1994).  
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In comparison to the previous study, Mero and Motowidlo (1995) broadened the 
scope of accountability by investigating the effects of accountability on the accuracy and 
favorability of performance ratings. It was hypothesized that raters who are held 
accountable for their ratings in a motivational context which there are no special 
pressures to achieve a certain rating outcome will rate more accurately than raters in the 
same motivational context who are not held accountable, and the authors also 
hypothesized that motivational contexts that do exert special pressures to achieve certain 
outcomes. Accountable raters in these situations will feel the personal implications of 
their ratings more acutely than nonaccountable raters and should be more motivated to 
avoid personal consequences that might be aversive for them. In comparison to 
Antonioni’s (1994) limited definition of accountability, Mero and Motowidlo (1995) 
operationalized accountability as the participants being informed that they would have to 
justify their ratings to the researchers. 247 undergraduate students performed an in-basket 
task and watched a videotaped simulation over two-weeks during two sessions.  The 
videotape contained vignettes that showed information about 4 simulated subordinates’ 
performance. After assigning the ratings to the simulated subordinates, participants in the 
accountability condition had to provide their ratings to their supervisors (the researchers) 
in either a motivational or nonmotivational context; or participants were assigned to the 
nonaccountability condition. The authors’ assessed participants’ accuracy by creating a 
variation of the ratio of positive and negative performance vignettes of the subordinates’ 
performance. Both hypotheses were supported in this study because participants who 
were held accountable with no motivational contexts rated the simulated subordinates 
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more accurately than nonaccountable participants. Also, participants who were held 
accountable with a motivational context, specifically that the subordinates received low 
performance ratings in the past, were more favorable on their ratings as compared to 
raters who were not held accountable (Mero & Motowidlo, 1995). The authors showed 
the potential positive benefits of the use of accountability within the appraisal system, 
mainly that employees would possibly provide more accurate ratings.  
Frink and Ferris (1998) continued to examine the effects of accountability in a 
performance appraisal process in both a laboratory and field setting. The authors 
hypothesized that participants would set higher goals in a high-accountability condition 
as compared to a low or no accountability condition; it was hypothesized that participants 
would have higher levels of context attentiveness and task attentiveness in the high 
accountability condition with the task outcomes are the primary criteria of accountability 
as compared to participants in the low or no-accountability condition; and it was 
hypothesized that performance would be influenced by the interaction between 
accountability and goals, in which the correlation between goals and performance in a 
high accountability condition would be significantly different than in a low versus no 
accountability condition, and this correlation would be significantly lower in a high 
accountability-condition in comparison to a low accountability condition. In the 
laboratory experiment, 115 undergraduate students were assigned to either a high or no 
accountability condition; in the high accountability condition, participants completed 
questionnaires dealing with felt accountability, attentiveness, and a mathematical 
problem set and afterwards they were told that they would have meet with a team leader 
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to discuss their goals as compared to participants in the no accountability condition being 
dismissed after conducting the questionnaires. Results from this laboratory experiment 
supported the three original hypotheses. Along with a laboratory experiment, the authors 
conducted a field study in which 27 telemarketers completed the same questionnaires as 
the participants did in the laboratory experiment; yet, rather than being assigned to 
conditions, the authors performed a median split on the felt accountability questionnaire 
as a basis of placing telemarketers into a low or high accountability condition. Similar to 
the laboratory experiment, all of the hypotheses were supported except for a part of the 
second original hypothesis, that high accountability will result in higher levels of task 
attentiveness as compared to the other accountability conditions. There were several 
implications from this study, that participants goal-directed behavior may be reduced by 
accountability conditions; although this finding differed from previous research findings, 
the authors results still indicated that accountability caused a greater amount of cognitive 
thought processing among the telemarketers and participants which falls in line with 
previous research and it showed how accountability could have positive benefits for 
organizations.  
Beckner, Highhouse, and Hazer (1998) conducted a field study that examined the 
effects of upward accountability and rating purpose on peer-rater inflation and delay. The 
authors defined upward accountability as raters’ expectation that they would have to 
provide justification for peers’ ratings to their supervisor. 93 clerical, technical, client 
service, and administrative employees completed a peer-appraisal instrument and they 
were randomly assigned to a 2 (upward accountability v no accountability) by 2 
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(administrative purpose versus research purpose) experimental design. The results 
showed that when workers were held accountable to their supervisors and conducted the 
peer-appraisals for research purposes only, they were more likely to delay their ratings. 
The authors found no significant effect for administrative purpose on rater delay, and 
they also found that purpose had no significant effect on peer-rating inflation. 
Surprisingly, the authors found no significant effects of upward accountability on peer-
rating inflation (Beckner et al., 1998).  Although they authors did not find a significant 
effect for upward accountability on peer-rating inflation, upward accountability may be 
more effective for subordinates and managers providing ratings of each other. 
Gordon and Stuecher (2001) continued the former line of research on upward 
accountability by examining the effects of accountability and anonymity on the linguistic 
complexity of teaching evaluations. The authors hypothesized that participants who had 
to describe their evaluation of their instructor to a faculty member (i.e., upward 
accountability) would have more complex evaluations and when participants had to 
describe their instruct evaluations to another student, those evaluations would exhibit less 
complexity. The authors also hypothesized that the condition in which participants had to 
provide an explanation of their evaluation to a faculty member along with sign the form 
would yield the most complex instructor evaluation. 157 undergraduate students were 
assigned to a two (anonymous v signed) by 3 (low student v high student v high-faculty 
accountability between subjects design).  The authors found that there was no significant 
main effect for anonymity on the complexity of teaching evaluations but they found that 
participants in the high-faculty accountability condition exhibited the highest complexity 
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on their evaluations of their teachers as compared to low and high student accountability 
conditions. As predicted, the authors also found that condition in which upward 
accountability was coupled with an identifiable form yielded the most evaluation 
complexity as compared to the other conditions. Several factors from this study should be 
noted, that the authors were using anonymity and accountability as two independent 
variables. This should be of interest to the reader because accountability entails a form of 
anonymity within the definition, mainly identifiability. Also, in contrast to the Beckner et 
al. (1998) study and in conjunction with previous accountability research, this study’s 
upward accountability condition did help aid in more complex instructor evaluations 
which could be argued to produce more accurate student evaluations of instructors.  
Instead of looking at the effects of accountability based off of its previous 
conceptualizations, Brtek and Motowidlo (2002) examined the effects of accountability 
in terms of procedure and outcome accountability on interview validity. 338 
undergraduates were assigned the role of an interviewer and they were assigned to one of 
four conditions: procedure accountability only, procedure and outcome accountability, 
outcome accountability only, and no accountability. The authors hypothesized that 
holding participants procedurally accountable would increase the validity of the interview 
whereas holding participants accountable for accuracy of the outcome of their interview 
ratings would lower the validity of the interview. It is also important to note that the 
positive effects that procedure accountability had on interview validity was mediated bay 
participants’ attentiveness (Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002).  
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Mero, Guidice, and Brownless (2007) studied the effects of audience and form of 
accounting on rater response and behavior were studied on 197 MBA students, in which 
these students rated an undergraduate team of students performing a task, and the MBA 
students had to provide the ratings to either the team of students (downward 
accountability) or to the session administrator (upward accountability); it is important to 
note that they also had a mixed accountability condition in which the participants had to 
justify their ratings to both the session administrator and the team of students (Mero et 
al., 2007). The participants also had to justify their ratings to each audience either by 
face-to-face or by justifying their ratings via a written evaluation of why they believed 
the team of students received the ratings that the participants assigned to them. The 
authors found that when the participants had to provide their ratings of the student team’s 
performance to the session administrator, these ratings were less inflated and lenient in 
comparison to the team of students or a no accountability condition; the authors also 
found that raters who were required to meet face-to-face to provide justification for their 
ratings were more accurate than participants who had to provide a written justification of 
their ratings (Mero et al., 2007). It is important to realize that this study is just one of 
many studies that demonstrated how accountability can reduce inflation and leniency in 
performance appraisals to yield more accurate ratings. 
The Present Study 
Although previous research has demonstrated the effects of accountability on 
performance appraisals, scant literature exists regarding the effects of accountability on 
reducing leniency of self-appraisals. To the author’s knowledge, only one study has 
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directly examined the effects of accountability on reducing inflation in self-appraisals and 
this study will be covered in more detail below. 
Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, and Dardis (2002) studied whether accountability was 
a deterrent to self-enhancement. The authors argued that although self-enhancement is 
related to many positive social and psychological benefits, it also is associated with social 
and personal conflict with other people (Sedikides et al., 2002). They conducted four 
experiments to determine whether accountability could help curb self-enhancement bias 
in one’s self-evaluations. Participants were required to complete an essay about whether 
the United States should study the planet Mars via space exploration and the participants 
had to grade their own essay on dimensions that were given to them by the 
experimenters. After grading their own essays, participants in the accountability 
(accountability versus no accountability) condition were told that they would have to 
“explain, justify, and defend” their responses to “an accomplished writer,” Chris Becker. 
The authors found that when participants were held accountable for their self-evaluations 
of their essays, the self-enhancement bias was reduced among the self-evaluations of the 
essays compared to when the participants were not held accountable. The authors also 
found from their multiple experiments that the identification category had the most 
profound effect on curtailing the self-enhancement bias. 
 Although the authors in the previous study were making a step in the right 
direction regarding assessing whether accountability could curtail self-enhancement bias 
in self-evaluations, their study does not directly pertain to performance appraisal. The 
authors of the previous study limited their generalizability when they made their 
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participants write an essay about Mars because this topic is not applicable to a 
performance appraisal context or, arguably, to any daily activity in the participants’ lives.  
Unless people are employees at NASA, they usually do not have to complete essay 
assignments about a planet within the solar system. The generalizability of this study is 
further limited because the participants may not have been knowledgeable about the 
United States’ pursuit exploring Mars; more importantly, the participants may not have 
held much weight to the essay assignment itself because they may have felt that they 
would not really have to be accountable to another person in order to gain course credit 
for participation in the study; it seems as if these researchers would have attempted to 
achieve accountability in a way that would make participants feel that their course credit 
would depend on how well they justify their ratings to either a member of a high or low 
audience in order to increase the generalizability of their study.  Generally speaking, 
because the topic in this study had no implications or ties to the introductory psychology 
course, the participants may not have taken the assignment seriously.  
The fact that the study consisted of the participants providing a written 
justification to “an accomplished writer” was problematic for their operationalization of 
accountability because they assumed that the “accomplished writer” would be a member 
of the “high-audience”. In reality, it could be argued that the participants saw the 
accomplished writer as an illegitimate source of accountability because although the 
fictional “Chris Becker” was well versed in Logic and English, he did not play a pivotal 
role in the participants fulfilling their introductory psychology course option. 
Furthermore, the participants may have thought that he was an illegitimate source of 
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accountability because he was merely a graduate student and they may have believed that 
he would not play an instrumental role to their hypothetical final essay grade. In addition 
to these issues, the accountability manipulation checks are questionable. For the first 
accountability manipulation check, “My grading of the essay will be ___,” participants 
answered this question on a Likert scale that ranged from 1, completely confidential, to 7, 
attributable to me personally; it seems as if this manipulation check was illogical because 
if participants did not feel that the essay grade would not be attributable to them, then a 
rating of 1 should have stated this exactly rather than completely confidential.  It seems as 
if completely confidential could have evoked a perception from the participants that their 
grades would be private and not disclosed publicly (or to their professors). As a result of 
this illogical flaw on the first accountability manipulation check, the authors could not 
truly determine how accountable the participants felt for the grade that they received on 
their essay assignment. Regarding the second manipulation check, “How well would you 
assess Chris Becker’s status as an essay reviewer?” it seems that this question did not 
address whether participants felt that they had to justify and explain their ratings to this 
supposed member of the high audience; instead, participants may have thought that this 
manipulation check merely asked them to rate how qualified he was to review their 
papers. Therefore, it seems as if the Sedikides et al. (2002) study’s operationalization of 
accountability is questionable.  
Therefore, the current study attempted to replicate the findings from the previous 
study of the effects of accountability on leniency reduction in self-appraisals. The present 
study attempted to apply accountability to a more realistic setting because it dealt with 
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self-appraisals of driving performance. Although driving performance may not be as 
generalizable as another job dimension, driving performance is multidimensional and it 
can be argued that driving performance is a job dimension that many companies and 
organizations must assess from their workers, workers who range from commercial truck 
drivers, bus drivers, and/or white-collar workers who are required to travel to various 
locations via an automobile. Accountability was operationalized as one being told that he 
or she would have to justify his or her driving performance ratings to either a professor 
who specializes in driving research (Upward Accountability) or to an education graduate 
student who is interested in driving performance (Illegitimate Accountability) via an 
audiotape. It is important to note that the current operationalization of Upward 
Accountability was strengthened because not only did participants in this condition have 
to report to a member of the higher audience, but also report to a member of the higher 
audience who had credibility (i.e., professor who has credibility because she specializes 
in driving research). This operationalization optimized the saliency of accountability.  
Hypotheses 
Based on the literature concerning self-appraisals and accountability, for the 
present study, the following hypotheses were developed:  
Hypothesis 1a: Participants in both accountability  conditions would make 
significantly more accurate ratings of their driving performance than participants in the 
no-accountability condition. 
Hypothesis 1b: Participants in the no-accountability condition would have more 
lenient ratings as compared to participants in both accountability conditions.  
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Hypothesis 2a: Participants in the illegitimate accountability condition would 
have significantly different ratings as compared to participants in the upward 
accountability condition.  
Hypothesis 2b: Participants in the illegitimate accountability condition would 
have more lenient ratings as compared to participants in the upward accountability 
condition.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
DESIGN AND METHOD 
 
Participants 
Participants were 57 university students from various psychology courses at a 
public southeastern land-grant university. Students participated in the study voluntarily 
and they received course credit for their participation in the study. 
Apparatus 
The study occurred in a state of the art Driving Simulator Lab, located at the 
Southeastern University. This Simulator Lab includes a GlobalSim Drive Safety 
automotive simulator with five forward visual channels and three rearward channels (two 
side mirrors and one rearview mirror); each channel displays 50 degrees field-of-view 
and high resolution (1024 x 768) textured graphics. The variables that were measured by 
the driving simulator were as follows: participant’s speed variability while driving, lane 
position, brake usage at stop signs, following distance, and acknowledgement of traffic 
lights. The major advantage of using a driving simulator was that it produced objective 
data that could be compared to the participants’ self-ratings of driving performance.  
Measures 
Self-evaluation questionnaire. Participants assessed their own driving 
performance on an 11 item self-rating scale (see Appendix A). Subjects were asked to 
rate their driving performance on a 5-point Likert scale anchored by 5 = Excellent, 1 = 
Poor (e.g., “How well did you stay in your lane while driving on the curvy roads?”).  
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The questionnaire was developed as follows. The initial questions were drafted 
based on the facets of driving performance that could be objectively measured in the 
driving simulator. After the questions were created, pilot studies were conducted in which 
students completed the driving scenario. After they have completed the driving scenario, 
students completed the self-rating questionnaires. After students completed the self-rating 
questionnaires, interviews were conducted with these students regarding the clarity, 
wording, and general structure of the self-rating questionnaire (and these interviews were 
taken into consideration if changes needed to be made on the self-rating questionnaire). 
Data from these pilot studies were collected and basic descriptive statistics were run to 
ensure that there were no irregularities in the self-rating questionnaire and to ensure that 
the questionnaire was reliable.   
The dimensions of driving performance that was measured were as follows: 
speed, lane position, red traffic light acknowledgment, braking, and following 
distances/times. The driving simulator produced data based off of a scenario that was 
created for the participants that lasted no more than 5 minutes. Participants rated how 
well they thought they followed the speed regulations throughout the driving scenario and 
the driving simulator produced data that indicated whether they followed the speed 
regulations by looking at their average speeds throughout the driving scenario; 
participants rated how well they thought they stayed in their lane throughout the scenario 
and the driving simulator produced data that indicated their average lane position 
throughout the scenario; participants rated how well they thought they acknowledged a 
red traffic light (via stopping) within the driving scenario and the driving simulator 
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produced data that indicated whether they acknowledged the red traffic light (via 
stopping), and the braking dimension was also based off of the red traffic light 
acknowledgment; participants rated how well they thought they followed a car in front of 
them and the driving simulator produced data that indicated the following distance of the 
participants during the scenario.  
Design  
This study was a post-test only factorial design in which accountability (Upward 
Accountability, Illegitimate Accountability, and No Accountability) was the independent 
variable and difference scores (e.g., z-score for the simulator for braking minus z-score 
for the self-rating score of braking) for the dimensions of driving performance were the 
dependent variables. In contrast to the Sedikides et al. (2002) study, Upward 
Accountability entailed participants being required to complete and submit an audiotape 
in which they explained to the professor—who specializes in driving research—why they 
rated themselves the way they did (along with the actual self-ratings) for their self-
ratings. The participants in the Upward Accountability condition were told that they had 
to justify their self-ratings of their driving performance on an audiotape that would be 
sent to a professor who specializes in driving research.  Illegitimate Accountability 
entailed all of the facets that were within the Upward Accountability operationalization 
but instead of participants justifying their ratings to professor (who specializes in driving 
research), they justified their self-ratings to a graduate student who maintains the driving 
simulator. The No Accountability condition entailed participants completing their self-
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assessments and giving an explanation of their ratings on an audiotape AFTER they 
completed their self-assessments.  
Procedure 
The participants entered the lab and they were asked to fill out a consent form. 
Participants were given 3-4 minutes to practice a warm up scenario in the driving 
simulator. After the warm up, the participants got into the car and got comfortable with 
the controls and seating within the car; after they got comfortable, the participants were 
prompted to begin the driving scenario—which consisted of the variables that are listed 
in the apparatus section. After completing the scenario, the participants were told to stop. 
Once the participants stopped the scenario, they got out of the car and if the participants 
were in the Upward Accountability condition, they were told, “You will be audiotaped 
[point to the audiotape] about your driving performance after you have completed your 
self-rating scales. On the audiotape, in two minutes or less, please explain to Dr. Brooks, 
a professor who specializes in driving research, why the ratings you gave yourself were 
an accurate indication of your performance in the driving simulator, and this audiotape 
will be sent to Dr. Brooks”. If the participants were in the Illegitimate Accountability 
condition, they were told “You will be audiotaped [point to the audiotape] about your 
interview after you have completed your self-rating scales. On the audiotape, in two 
minutes or less, please explain to the Matt Crisler, an education graduate student who is 
interested in driving performance, why the ratings you gave yourself were an accurate 
indication of your performance in the driving simulator, and this audiotape will be sent to 
Matt”. If the participants were in the No Accountability condition, they were told, “I will 
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now give you a self-rating scale in which you will assess your driving performance. After 
I have handed you the self-rating scale, please begin filling it out. Please let me know if 
you have any questions.[ After the participant has completed the self-rating scale]In two 
minute or less, please explain on this audiotape why the ratings you gave yourself were 
an accurate indication of your performance in the driving simulator”. After each 
participant completed both the questionnaire, they were given a chance to ask questions, 
and they were debriefed and dismissed. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTS 
 
Initial Analyses  
 Descriptive analyses were conducted to evaluate the characteristics of the 
independent variable, accountability (upward, illegitimate, and no-accountability), and 
the dependent variables (the difference scores for acknowledgement of traffic lights, lane 
keeping, acknowledgement of speed limit, following distance, and braking; see Tables 1, 
2, and 3). These statistics were also examined for errors and outliers. These data indicated 
that 14 of 57 participants did not stop during the stoplight/braking portion of the 
simulation. The ramifications of this finding will be discussed below.  
 The dependent variables were calculated as follows:  
(1) For each of the five dimensions/areas of driving (lane-keeping, speed vs. 
speed limit, following distance, braking, and traffic light compliance) a z-score 
was calculated for the simulator performance data for each participant. 
(2)  For these same dimensions a z-score was calculated for the self-assessment of 
performance for each participant.  
(3) A difference score between the simulator-rated performance and the self-rated 
performance was calculated for each dimension for each participant. 
(4) These difference scores are the “raw” dependent variables in this study.  
If the participants’ difference scores were positive, then these scores indicated that 
the participants underestimated their driving performance, so they were modest. If 
the participants’ differences scores were negative, then these scores indicated that 
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the participants they overestimated their performance, they were overconfident 
and lenient on their self-ratings of their driving performance. We did not use 
absolute values or squares.  
Effects of Accountability on Self-Evaluations of Driving Performance 
 Two primary inferential analyses were conducted, one using all five of the 
simulator-generated variables and all participants, and one using a subset of  the 
participants, and one using a subset of both participants and dependent variables.   
First, a multiple dependent measures analysis of variance (MANOVA) was run using the 
difference scores for all five dimensions of driving performance. The accountability 
condition served as the independent variable with three levels: upward v. illegitimate v. 
no accountability. Note that a step-down/stepwise procedure for selecting the dependent 
variables was not used here. Choices of dependent variables for MANOVAs were made 
on conceptual and theoretical bases. The results from the MANOVA indicated that the 
accountability condition did not have a significant effect on leniency reduction of 
participants’ self-ratings of their driving performance. However, a substantial number of 
the participants ran the red light during the braking and traffic light portion of the 
simulation. While this behavior was one of the variables in the first MANOVA, we 
considered the possibility that this behavior indicated that these participants were not 
taking the simulation seriously—in other words this behavior may have indicated that 
these participants were outliers. Therefore, the MANOVA was run again without these 
participants which left a remainder of 43 data points in the dataset. The results from this 
MANOVA indicated that the accountability condition had a significant effect on the 
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leniency reduction of self-rating scales for dimensions of driving performance (F(8, 74) = 
2.067, p = .05).  
  Figure 1 indicates that accountability had a significant effect on leniency 
reduction in self-ratings of driving performance. Overall, the figure indicates that 
participants in the upward accountability condition exhibited the least leniency in their 
self-ratings of driving performance across all dimensions. The participants’ leniency 
levels fluctuated across the illegitimate and no accountability conditions across the four 
dimensions of driving performance. 
 As shown in Figure 1, the results for the effects of accountability on the accuracy 
of self-rating scales are mixed. Participants in the no accountability condition tended to 
most accurately assess their own driving performance on the lane and following 
dimensions in comparison to participants in the upward and illegitimate accountability 
conditions. Yet, participants in both upward and illegitimate accountability conditions 
tended to most accurately assess their own driving performance on the speed and braking 
dimensions in comparison to participants in the no accountability condition. As an 
exploratory variable, an analysis of gender differences in response to authority was done 
and no significant gender differences were found.   
Therefore, accountability had a significant effect on the leniency reduction of the 
participants’ self-ratings of their driving performance. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The current study attempted to determine whether accountability could help to 
curb leniency in self-ratings of driving performance. Although one previous research 
study attempted to examine the effects of accountability on self-appraisals, the 
experimental design of that study was questionable. In attempt to make the current study 
more generalizable to an applied setting, a driving simulator was used in order to have an 
objective measure of driving performance, a multidimensional construct that is relevant 
for various applied work settings. The main benefit of using a driving simulator in the 
current study was that it was an objective measure that could be used to compare the 
participants’ driving performance, per this objective measure, with the participants’ self-
ratings of driving performance to determine how accurate the participants were and to 
determine whether or not they overestimated how well they thought they performed in 
the driving simulator.  
 The results showed support for an effect of accountability on leniency reduction 
of self-ratings of driving performance. It is important to note that the operational 
definitions of accuracy and leniency. Accuracy was defined as how much the Driving 
Simulator z-scores and self-rating z-scores converged with each other and this is 
indicated through the difference score; thus, the larger the difference-score (in either a 
positive or negative direction) the more inaccurate the participants were with their self-
ratings of driving performance; the smaller the difference score (in either the positive or 
negative direction), the more accurate the participants were with their self-ratings of 
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driving performance. Leniency is defined as the participants overestimating their driving 
performance by giving themselves higher performance ratings on their self-rating scales 
(this would be indicated by a negative difference score).   
 The first hypothesis stated that participants in both accountability conditions 
would make significantly more accurate ratings of their driving performance than 
participants in the no-accountability condition. For the four main dimensions of driving 
performance (speed, following, lane position, and braking) that were measured, this 
hypothesis was partially supported. The participants in the upward and illegitimate 
accountability conditions made more accurate ratings of driving performance for the 
speed and braking dimensions than the participants in the no-accountability condition. 
The results did not yield similar findings with regards to lane and following dimensions.  
 The second hypothesis stated that participants in the no-accountability condition 
would have more lenient ratings as compared to participants in both accountability 
conditions. The results generally supported this finding (with the exception of the 
following dimension). 
 The third hypothesis stated that participants in the illegitimate accountability 
condition would have significantly different ratings as compared to participants in the 
upward accountability condition and this hypothesis was generally supported (as 
indicated in Figure 1). Additionally, it was expected that participants in the upward 
accountability condition would have the least lenient ratings in comparison to both the 
illegitimate and no accountability conditions and this finding was supported.    
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 The fourth and final hypothesis stated that participants in the illegitimate 
accountability condition would have more lenient ratings as compared to participants in 
the upward accountability condition and the results generally tended to support that 
finding as indicated in Figure 1.  Therefore, the results show that accountability changes 
the nature of self-ratings/self-appraisals. 
 It is interesting to note how the difference scores between the no accountability 
and illegitimate accountability conditions fluctuated between three out of the four 
dimensions of driving performance, the braking, following, and lane dimensions. Two 
implications can be drawn from this finding. First, indeed, these three dimensions of 
driving performance served as manipulation checks for the operationalizations of the 
illegitimate accountability condition. If participants were assigned to the illegitimate 
accountability condition, they were informed that they would have to justify their ratings 
to an education graduate student who was interested in studying their ratings of driving 
performance. As shown in Figure 1, participants in the illegitimate accountability 
condition exhibited the most lenient self-ratings of driving performance for these three 
dimensions, and it seems probable that they exhibited the most leniency because they 
thought that having to justify their ratings of driving performance for these three 
measures to an education graduate student was bogus (which was the point of this 
condition). It seems as if they did not believe that they would be held accountable for 
their self-ratings when they had to justify them to an education graduate student in 
comparison to participants who had to justify their self-ratings to a driving researcher or 
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to no one (as the difference scores for participants in these two conditions were the more 
modest).  
 The point that these three dimensions of driving performance served as a 
manipulation check for the illegitimate accountability condition ties into the second point 
that these dimensions may not have been taken seriously by the participants in this 
condition. It could be argued that the speed variable of driving performance was more 
meaningful to these participants because they realized that more tangible consequences 
result from poor performance on this dimensions. For instance, if people fail to 
acknowledge the speed limits in real life, then they can face the possibility of a speeding 
violation, the loss of their license, or even jail time. But for the lane and following 
dimensions, it may have been hard for the participants to see any tangible consequences 
that could result from their poor performance on these two dimensions and so they may 
have been more prone to give themselves higher ratings on these performance dimensions 
in the illegitimate accountability dimension than the other two accountability conditions. 
If people are out of their lane then they attempt to get back in it; even if people are 
following a car too closely, many of them believe that there is enough room between their 
own car and the car in front of them and they believe that they are effectively able to 
handle prevent serious injuries to themselves or to other drivers. In fact, research has 
shown that people gauge how well they are driving by how well they can maintain their 
lane position (i.e., how well they can stay in the center of the lane; J. O. Brooks, personal 
communication, February, 12, 2009). If people use their brakes to stop at a traffic light or 
prevent themselves from getting into an accident, then they may feel that they are able to 
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effectively utilize their brakes (the braking pedal). If this logic is applied to the difference 
scores for these two dimensions, then it is easy to see why participants in the illegitimate 
accountability condition were more prone to make more lenient self-ratings of their 
driving performance on these two dimensions; it seems probable that they thought that 
they could defend their performance on these three dimensions to an education graduate 
student because of the fact that they would know that the education graduate student 
would not be as knowledgeable about what constitutes good driving performance in 
comparison to a driving researcher.  
 In addition to the noted fluctuations that occurred across the illegitimate and no 
accountability conditions for the following and lane difference scores, an additional 
observation was found for participants’ performance on the speed dimension of driving 
performance. The data showed that participants misjudged their speed, specifically they 
underestimated their velocity (i.e., they thought they were going slower than they actually 
were). It is also important to provide an explanation for why the traffic light variable was 
removed from the data analyses. The traffic light variable was thrown out of the data 
analyses because of some issues that existed with this measurement. The traffic light 
variable was coded as a dichotomous variable and this type of measurement was 
inappropriate for the purpose of my experiment. The fact that this variable was 
dichotomous made it very difficult to gauge how well participants acknowledged the stop 
light because it may have been the case where the participants stopped at the traffic light 
but at the last minute (which in real life could have caused an accident or interrupted 
traffic flow).  
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 The aforementioned findings regarding participants’ in the illegitimate 
accountability condition, self-ratings of driving performance have implications for the 
use of accountability in applied setting. If organizations implement self-appraisals and 
hold employees accountable for these appraisals, they must make the employees 
accountable to a legitimate source. If it is the case where employees would have to justify 
their ratings to peers or to someone whom the employees would feel that they would not 
feel obliged to provide justification of their self-ratings of their job performance, then 
they would be more likely to inflate their ratings of their own job performance. If 
organizations would make this error in holding participants accountable to an illegitimate 
source, then their implementation of the self-appraisals within the general performance 
appraisal system would be counterproductive because they would end up obtaining bogus 
self-appraisals that would be filled with inflation and leniency bias.  
 In addition to the manipulation check, one may argue against the need for 
accountability in self-ratings of job performance based on the results that showed that 
participants in the no accountability condition were more accurate on some dimensions of 
driving performance than participants in the upward accountability and at times 
participants in this condition underestimated their ability of driving performance. But it is 
important to note that previous research has shown that self-rating scales are inaccurate 
and prone to self-inflation and leniency biases. Not only is this argument misleading 
because of previous research, but also is misleading in the context of the current study 
due to the ambiguity of some of the dimensions of driving performance that were 
measured. When the participants provided justification for their self-ratings of driving 
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performance via audiotape, many indicated that the driving simulator felt odd or weird 
and they felt that it affected their driving ability as compared to a real-time driving 
environment. For instance, many participants mentioned that both the brake pedal and 
steering wheel were extremely sensitive than what they were accustomed to in their own 
cars; the fact that participants made these comments could imply that their self-ratings on 
lane position, following, and braking may have been affected so that they would be prone 
to underestimate and rate themselves more poorly on their ability to perform on these 
three dimensions of driving performance (as Figure 1 indicates). Additionally, the author 
of the current study created segments of the driving scenario for these three measures of 
driving performance that produced uncertainty for the participants. For instance, for the 
following dimension of driving performance, the author created a segment of the scenario 
where participants were driving on a highway and then they suddenly traversed a two-
lane roadway that contained cars driving extremely slow when they switched from the 
highway to this roadway. Because of the way that this segment (as well as other 
segments) of the scenario was created, participants in the upward and no accountability 
conditions may have been prone to underestimate their driving performance for the 
braking, following and speed dimensions (but not for the illegitimate accountability 
condition for reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph).  Yet, participants in the 
upward accountability condition may have underestimated their performance even more 
so than participants in the no-accountability condition because of the fact that they were 
told that they would have to justify their self-ratings to a professor who specializes in 
driving research. 
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 The author felt the need to incorporate accuracy into the study because accuracy 
and leniency usually go hand in hand in the performance appraisal literature; if self-
ratings are lenient, then they are most likely to be inaccurate. Yet, many of the 
dimensions of driving performance that were measured in the current study were plagued 
with ambiguity and variability within these dimensions which took away from the ability 
to measure the accuracy of the self-rating scales. Future research should contain cleaner 
and more precise dimensions of a performance construct that are very comprehensible to 
the participants in order to measure the accuracy of their self-appraisals. But the 
aforementioned findings do not take away from the significance of the results that were 
yielded in the current study. The primary purpose of the study was to determine whether 
accountability could help reduce leniency in self-ratings of driving performance and the 
results showed just that. The results showed that accountability can help curb leniency in 
self-rating scales of driving performance and, in fact, participants in the upward 
accountability were more likely to underestimate themselves on their driving 
performance on their self-rating scales in comparison to participants in the other two 
accountability conditions. Yet, the author believes that this underestimation 
(overcompensation) effect was an artifact of the current study and that this effect would 
not exist in an applied setting. If employees were held accountable to their supervisors or 
to an employee higher in the leader hierarchy of an organization in comparison to 
participants who were not held accountable to any higher level employee, then there 
would be a significant gap in the leniency on the self-appraisals that exist between these 
two groups. Again, as research has shown, it would be most likely that participants who 
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were not held accountable would exhibit extremely inflated self-ratings of their job 
performance and participants who were held accountable to a member of a higher 
audience would not exhibit leniency in their self-appraisals; so, in other words, they 
would most likely give an accurate assessment of their job performance.  
 The findings from this study have numerous implications for the use of 
accountability and self-rating scales in applied settings. As indicated earlier, many 
employees perceive performance appraisal systems as being unfair and not based on their 
actual performance. These perceptions also could lead to employees having feelings of 
negative affect and job dissatisfaction towards their organizations. Recently, self-
appraisals have been employed as a participatory mechanism and self-improvement 
mechanism for all employees because the employees perceive this appraisal as being fair 
and an accurate assessment of their performance. The use of performance appraisals is 
one way in which employees can have a voice or input into the performance appraisal 
process. As a result of them having input in the performance appraisal process, these 
employees are more likely to perceive the system as being fair as well as the organization 
as a whole (Roberts, 2002).  Yet, research has shown that self-appraisals are highly 
susceptible to leniency bias as employees tend to inflate their ratings of their job 
performance. Although the fact that self-appraisals exhibit leniency, the omission of this 
piece of job performance data in 360 feedback is troubling as the current sources of 
performance appraisals are flawed. When supervisors provide appraisals of employees’ 
job performance, they are basing them only on hardcore outcomes, such as productivity 
or sales quotas, more so than the employees’ actual job performance. Additionally, peer 
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ratings of subordinates’ job performance are questionable as well because research has 
shown that many peers (coworkers) are lenient on their appraisals of subordinates’ job 
performance (Muchinsky, 2003). So, it seems most fitting to attempt to increase the 
accuracy and reduce the leniency of self-appraisals so that they can be incorporated into 
the performance appraisal system in order to obtain more descriptive and precise 
information about employees’ job performance within organizations.   
 Based on the findings from the current study, it seems as if accountability seems 
to be a potential mechanism for curbing leniency and inflation in self-appraisals of job 
performance. In previous studies accountability has been shown to increase the accuracy 
of performance appraisals. Accountability can also help curb leniency in self-appraisals 
of job performance because when employees know that someone else is observing their 
behavior of their job performance (e.g., coworkers, supervisors, etc.); when employees 
know that they will be identified on their self-appraisals; when employees know that their 
self-ratings will be evaluated by a higher authority, and, finally, when employees have to 
justify their ratings of their own performance to a higher authority (e.g., supervisor or 
manager), then it seems as if they will be more likely to make accurate ratings of their 
self-appraisals. Thus, if organizations employ both self-appraisals and accountability into 
their performance appraisal system, then it seems most likely that they will have happier 
employees and will believe that they will be appraised on their actual job performance.    
Limitations and Future Research 
 It is important to note the limitations that exist in the current study.  Although my 
study exhibited minimal threats to internal validity, it faced a few threats to external 
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validity. One main limitation to the current study was the saliency of the accountability 
manipulation. Although the current study made a significant improvement to the 
experimental design and operationalization of accountability over and above those in the 
Sedikides et al. (2002) study, the operationalization was still weak. The fact that the 
participants received course credit regardless of the accountability condition may have 
weakened the effect that accountability had on leniency reduction. Future research should 
examine the effects of accountability on leniency reduction in self-appraisals with a more 
hardcore tangible outcomes (promotions, pay raises, etc.) that would be entailed within 
the upward accountability condition that would be dependent upon them justifying their 
ratings of their driving performance to a higher authority. 
 In addition to the saliency of the definition of accountability, the observed effect 
that was found in the present study for accountability may only be found in laboratory 
experiments and may not be generalizable to the work setting. Although this may be the 
case, it seems as if the argument could be made that the effect of accountability on 
leniency reduction of self-appraisals would be more pronounced in the applied setting 
because, in comparison to a laboratory setting, there are various financial and hardcore 
outcomes that could be tied to the accountability condition to make the employees more 
likely to be more accurate on their self-appraisals if these self-appraisals were 
incorporated into the performance appraisal system. Future research should examine the 
effects of accountability on leniency reduction of self-appraisals in the workplace. 
Additionally, with the use of a laboratory research design, many of the perceived causes 
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of leniency bias were controlled for, such as ambiguity of the purpose of the appraisal 
system, and levels of self-esteem.  
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APPENDIX 
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Self-Rating Scale of Driving-Performance 
Self-Evaluation of Driving Performance Form  
         Participant #: _____ 
Instructions: For the following statements please rate the quality of your driving 
performance in the driving scenario by circling a number from “1”, POOR, to “5”, 
EXCELLENT (please feel free to make comments under the statements): 
 
1) How would you rate your performance in staying in your lane while driving on curvy 
roads during the driving scenario? 
                                  1        2                     3               4          5 
           Poor        Barely Acceptable       Good           Fairly Well     Excellent 
 
2) How good were you at driving at the speed limit?   
 
                                  1        2                     3               4          5 
           Poor        Barely Acceptable       Good           Fairly Well     Excellent 
 
3) How would you rate your acknowledgment of traffic lights in the driving scenario? 
                                  1        2                     3               4          5 
           Poor        Barely Acceptable       Good           Fairly Well     Excellent 
  
4) How would you rate your performance in maintaining a safe distance between your car 
and the car in front of you during the driving scenario? 
                                  1        2                     3               4          5 
           Poor        Barely Acceptable       Good           Fairly Well     Excellent 
  
5) How would you rate your performance in using your brakes when required (e.g., at a 
stoplight) during the driving scenario? 
                                  1        2                     3               4          5 
           Poor        Barely Acceptable       Good           Fairly Well     Excellent 
 
6) How would you rate your performance in controlling the steering wheel of the vehicle 
during the driving scenario? 
                                  1        2                     3               4          5 
           Poor        Barely Acceptable       Good           Fairly Well     Excellent 
 
7) How would you rate your performance in using your brakes when necessary during the 
driving scenario? 
                                  1        2                     3               4          5 
           Poor        Barely Acceptable       Good           Fairly Well     Excellent 
 
 
8) How would you rate your performance on not following the car in front of you too 
closely during the driving scenario? 
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                                  1        2                     3               4          5 
           Poor        Barely Acceptable       Good           Fairly Well     Excellent 
 
 
 
9) How would you rate your performance in driving at speeds that are at or around the 
speed limits in the driving scenario? 
                                  1        2                     3               4          5 
           Poor        Barely Acceptable       Good           Fairly Well     Excellent 
 
10) How would you rate your performance in stopping at the red stoplight in the driving 
scenario? 
                                  1        2                     3               4          5 
           Poor        Barely Acceptable       Good           Fairly Well     Excellent 
 
11) How would you rate your overall driving performance? 
                                  1        2                     3               4          5 
           Poor        Barely Acceptable       Good           Fairly Well     Excellent 
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Table 1: Raw Data From the Driving Simulator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
Accountability 
Condition 
 Lane 
Keeping: 
M 
(SD) 
Following: 
M 
(SD) 
Speed: 
M 
(SD) 
Traffic 
Light: 
M 
(SD) 
Braking: 
M 
(SD) 
Upward 
Accountability 
.004 
(0.16) 
1.69 
(0.76) 
4.07 
(2.10) 
.68 
(0.48) 
.03 
(0.08) 
Illegitimate 
Accountability 
-.03 
(0.17) 
1.47 
(0.42) 
3.95 
(1.69) 
.84 
(0.37) 
.09 
(0.06) 
No Accountability -.02 
(0.15) 
1.65 
(0.84) 
3.75 
(2.14) 
.74 
(0.45) 
.05 
(0.06) 
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Table 2 Raw Data From The Self-Ratings 
Accountability 
Condition 
 Lane 
Keeping: 
M 
(SD) 
Following: 
M 
(SD) 
Speed: 
M 
(SD) 
Traffic 
Light: 
M 
(SD) 
Braking: 
M 
(SD) 
Upward 
Accountability 
3.32 
(0.93) 
3.92 
(0.77) 
3.37 
(0.86) 
3.95 
(0.72) 
3.34 
(0.71) 
Illegitimate 
Accountability 
3.58 
(0.56) 
4.39 
(0.76) 
3.68 
(0.58) 
3.97 
(1.09) 
3.84 
(0.65) 
No Accountability 3.42 
(0.73) 
3.89 
(0.97) 
3.61 
(0.79) 
4.08 
(0.80) 
3.68 
(0.65) 
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Table 3 Difference Scores for Dimensions of Driving Performance 
 
  
 
Accountability 
Condition 
 Lane 
Keeping: 
Following: Speed: Traffic 
Light: 
Braking: 
Upward 
Accountability 
.35 .54 -.16 .43 .76 
Illegitimate 
Accountability 
-.45 -.67 -.22 .57 -.01 
No Accountability -.25 .33 -.82 .36 .26 
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Figure 1.  The effects of accountability on self-ratings of driving  performance (as 
measured by the difference scores for the lane, speed, following, and braking 
dimensions). 
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